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ABSTRACT: Public engagement in collaborative natural resource management necessitates perspective taking, 
shared understanding, and collaboration. There is currently little understanding about how to reliably generate 
perspective-taking and collaboration, particularly in situations involving the unequal distribution of resources. 
Here we examine how using a computer-mediated scenario to simulate resource gain and loss influenced 
individual perspective-taking and behavior. Participants (n=180) were randomly assigned to each condition: high 
resources, low resources, lose resources, gain resources. Multilevel analysis revealed that losing resources 
decreased perspective-taking and collaboration. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this 
research for public engagement in environmental decisions. 
KEYWORDS: collaborative behavior, computer-mediated communication, decision-making, environmental 
resources, perspective-taking, public participation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Natural resource management decisions are inherently difficult because they require input from 
multiple diverse groups with competing values and divergent interests (Brown & Harris, 2000; 
Jacobson & Decker, 2006). Collaborative natural resource management by communities, or in 
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partnership with government institutions, has had its share of failures. Ample evidence 
suggests that fragile social connections can hinder efforts to solve collective-action problems 
and contribute to collaborative resource failure (Acheson, 2006). Egoistic behavior and failed 
collaborative management can result in a “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968), where 
common pool resources (e.g., cod in New England, forests in Maine and water in the 
Southwest and Mexico) are depleted resulting in the subsequent collapse and closure of 
fisheries, the loss of forested habitat, and water shortages. According to theory, the key to 
transformative collaborative processes for natural resource management is to develop effective 
participatory processes that overcome divergent interests by building trust, commitment, and 
shared understanding among participants (Ansell & Gash, 2008). 
 The common theoretical assumption is that the collaborative process can transform 
combative stakeholders into cooperative partners that contribute to resolving public goods 
management challenges (Ostrom, 2000). According to theory, the collaborative process 
accomplishes this by enhancing shared understanding among participants, which then 
promotes collaborative behavior (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Perspective-taking is commonly 
described as an important precursor of shared understanding (Buckles & Rusnak, 1999; Ansell 
& Gash, 2008; Ostrom, 2000). Perspective-taking is a critical component of empathy and a 
facilitator of positive social interactions, such as collaboration. Defined as the ability to see 
situations through the eyes of others, perspective-taking facilitates social coordination, fosters 
social bonds (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) and promotes helping behavior (Cialdiani, Brown, 
Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997).  
 Perspective-taking can be manipulated and stimulated using images or videos of people 
or animals being harmed (Batson, Change, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Berenguer, 2007; Schultz, 
2000; Shelton & Rogers, 1981). Methods to induce perspective-taking have included 
“manipulation of observational sets, manipulations of actual physiological arousal, 
manipulations of attributions regarding one’s own arousal, similarity manipulations,…and 
empathic mood inductions” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p.93). Picture/story procedures were 
originally designed to measure empathy in young children (Feshbach & Roe, 1968).1 Studies 
have shown that messages triggering an empathic reaction can increase willingness to help 
abused children (Bagozzi & Moore, 1994), enhance the persuasiveness of a health risk 
communication campaign and the adoption of risk avoidance behaviors (Campbell & Babrow, 
2004), and increase helping behavior (Batson, 1994; Cialdiani et al., 1997). In a recent study, 
Shen (2011) found that messages designed to arouse a perspective-taking response were more 
effective than fear-arousing ones because they inhibited reactance to the persuasive 
message. When a simulated resource-sharing exercise was framed as a cooperative exercise 
with shared goals and interests, perspective-taking led to collaborative behavior among 
participants (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006).  
 However, despite evidence that persuasive messages and simulations can arouse 
perspective-taking and the well-established conceptual basis for the relationship between 
                                                
1  It is important to note that extensive research on empathy and prosocial behavior has been conducted with 
children. Because our intervention addresses collaboration between adults, we have not described this research 
in-depth. However, we are familiar with this line of research that suggests that modeling, positive 
reinforcement and empathic arousal can promote prosocial behavior among children (e.g., Eisenberg & 
Mussen 1989; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Hastings, Utendale & Sullivan 2007). Unfortunately, these results have 
been mixed and inconclusive, which has contributed to additional gaps in current understanding of how to 
effectively enhance prosocial behavior.  
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perspective-taking and collaborative behavior (Berenger, 2007, 2008; Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987; Galinsky et al., 2005), it is still unclear how to reliably arouse the perspective-taking of 
diverse collaborators to promote prosocial behavior for collaborative resource-based 
conservation. While evidence suggests that asking participants to consider the perspective of 
others can increase helping behavior (Batson, 1994; Cialdiani et al., 1997), alternative research 
suggests that within a simulated resource sharing exercise, perspective-taking can lead to 
reactive egoism (i.e., where expectations of self-serving behavior by others can contribute to 
egoistic behavior among participants) (Epley et al., 2006). Efforts to engender perspective-
taking and prosocial behavior are a critical component of sustainable resource management, 
but our understanding of how to encourage these variables in the context of natural resource 
dilemmas and in cases involving inequalities in starting resource power or control is confused 
at best (Acheson, 2006). 
 Following this line of thinking, this research tests whether a computer simulation, 
focused on the collaborative management of water resources in the Southwestern United 
States, can arouse individual perspective-taking and encourage collaborative behavior. 
Perspective-taking and collaborative behavior are measured over the course of two rounds of a 
simulated threshold public goods experiment. Since natural resource collaborations often 
involve groups with disparate access to and control over resources, we also explore how 
differences in starting and ending resource levels influence participants’ perspective-taking 
scores and collaborative behavior. This paper begins by reviewing the relevant literature and 
developing testable hypotheses. The successive sections report on a test of the hypotheses 
using a series of multilevel models. The article ends with implications for research and 
practice. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Empathic Perspective-taking  
Empathy is “the process(es) whereby one person can come to know the internal state of 
another and be motivated to respond with sensitive care” (Batson, Ahmad, & Lishner, 2011, 
p.11). While the full array of empathy can involve multiple components, key among these 
factors is the skill of perspective-taking, also called empathic perspective-taking (Preston & De 
Waal, 2002). Perspective-taking allows us to imagine what a character in a movie is feeling or 
to imagine what it feels like to walk in someone else’s shoes. “To be considerate, even in small 
ways, one needs empathic perspective-taking” (De Waal, 2009, p. 110). 
 Two important components of perspective-taking play a critical role in promoting 
collaborative behavior: individual perspective-taking (the cognitive process of imagining the 
experiences of another) and macro perspective-taking, which includes the social, political, and 
economic context for the social realities of the lives of other people (Segal, Wagaman, & 
Gerdes, 2012). Individual perspective-taking facilitates social bonds with new groups or 
individuals (Galinsky et al., 2005). Individual perspective-taking is the foundation on which 
the macro perspective-taking components can be developed (Segal et al., 2012). Macro 
perspective takers are interested in understanding why people are poor, understanding the 
political perspectives or opinions of people who are different from them, and helping people of 
a different race or ethnicity. Both types of perspective-taking are key in decreasing prejudice, 
facilitating social coordination (Galinsky et al., 2005), and improving intergroup attitudes and 
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relationships (Batson et al., 1997). Without individual perspective-taking, a person is not able 
to have macro perspective-taking. Both individual and macro perspective-taking skills are 
individual-level factors that could influence an individual’s ability and willingness to 
collaborate.  
 Previous studies using picture/story measures to arouse perspective-taking have found 
no connection between empathy and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). In 
addition, most of these measures focus primarily on an affective response to another’s emotion 
rather than a cognitive or perspective-taking response. Questionnaire measures of empathy 
have previously been used to infer a relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior (see 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972 - scale of emotional tendency; Stotland et al., 1978 – Fantasy-
Empathy Scale; and Davis, 1980, 1983a, 1983b). Previous research using survey measures 
have found a significant relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). Eisenberg and Miller (1987) suggest that surveys are a more appropriate 
measure of the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior than picture/story 
measures because they measure multiple items and situations and are generally designed to 
distinguish between the affective and cognitive components of empathy and specifically tap 
perspective-taking. The survey instrument we will use for this research, the Social Empathy 
Index (SEI), was developed by PI Segal and has been previously validated, tested and 
theoretically supported (Segal, 2011; Gerdes, Lietz, & Segal, 2011a; Segal, 2012; Segal et al., 
2012). The instrument has two perspective-taking components: a micro (interpersonal) and a 
macro (social) making it an excellent measure to use to assess perspective-taking.  
2.2 Perspective-taking and Prosocial Behavior 
Within our research, we treat perspective-taking as it has historically been treated in the 
psychological literature, as a vital and instrumental determinant of successful prosocial 
behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). There is strong theoretical and empirical support for the 
connection between perspective-taking and socially responsible behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987; Hoffman, 2000; Segal et al., 2012). Broadly, empathy can improve intergroup attitudes 
and relations (Batson et al., 1997; Stephan & Finlay, 1999), promote social interaction (Gerdes 
& Segal, 2009), civic engagement (Miaskiewicz & Monarchia, 2008), and social tolerance 
(Segal et al., 2012). More specifically, perspective-taking can increase social competence, 
generate a sense of psychological closeness between individuals, encourage helping behavior 
(Cialdini et al., 1997; Davis, 1983a), and increase mimicking behavior, which enhances 
coordinated interactions and prosocial behavior between individuals (Müller, 2012; van 
Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009).  
 Collaborative behaviors are included in the broad domain of prosocial behaviors, which 
include voluntary or intentional actions aimed at enhancing outcomes for others and for oneself 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Collaborative management of natural resources is a subtype of 
prosocial behavior. Prosocial action (i.e., collaboration over natural resources) can be 
motivated by altruism – where the actor performed the behavior with no expectation of 
personal benefit. The Batson Model of Altruistic and Prosocial Behavior (Batson, 1991) has 
conceptually linked empathy with altruistic motivations and prosocial behavior. In addition to 
altruistic motivation, non-altruistic actions can generate collaboration in an effort to avoid 
punishment or to benefit only oneself.  
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 Collaboration is also described as “a process through which parties who see different 
aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that 
go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible” (Gray, 1989, p. 5). Collaborative 
outcomes are often attributed to the successful development of trust, commitment, and 
understanding within the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Figure 1). There are few 
empirical studies, however, evaluating the individual boundary conditions (factors of the 
person) that may prevent or encourage commitment to the process, social trust or shared 
understanding that could facilitate prosocial action. Yet while individuals who are capable of 
taking the perspective of other people may be better at considering other’s concerns and more 
likely to try to see the world through the eyes of another, this may not always lead to 
collaborative behavior. Given that people generally believe they are more principled and 
trustworthy than others (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Epley & Dunning, 
2000) and assume others are egocentric and generally overemphasize the consequence of 
selfishness on other’s attitudes (Miller, 1999), higher perspective-taking ability may ironically 
contribute to greater mistrust, doubt and reduced cooperative behavior among individuals 
prompted to take the perspective of others.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified version of ‘A Model of Collaborative Governance’ developed by Ansell & 
Gash (2008) 
2.3 Power/control and collaborative behavior 
In their review of 137 cases of collaborative governance, Ansell & Gash (2008) described 
institutional design (i.e., participatory inclusiveness, clear ground rules, process transparency 
and forum exclusiveness), starting conditions (i.e., power-resource-knowledge asymmetries, 
incentives for and constraints on participation, and prehistory of cooperation or conflict), and 
facilitative leadership as external factors that “set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social 
capital that become resources or liabilities during collaboration” (p. 550) (Figure 1). Power, 
particularly perceived social power, is an important starting condition of collaboration that can 
also influence perspective-taking.  
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 Within collaborative natural resource management, power is the ability to control 
resources and influence decision-making (Fiske, 1993; Reed, 2008). Disparities in power, 
ubiquitous in real world governance challenges, are described as key barriers to meaningful 
collaboration because such disparities prevent less powerful stakeholders from participating in 
the decision-making process (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Powerful players can dominate the 
collaborative process or take self-interested action that excludes important stakeholders and 
thwarts collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Leach, 2006; Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002; 
Purdy, 2012). When resources are scarce and distributed unequally, collaborative processes are 
more prone to manipulation by powerful stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Leach, 2006). 
However, power is believed to both increase and decrease empathic accuracy (Côté et al., 
2011) and reduce the ability to understand others’ thoughts, feelings and point of view 
(Galinsky, Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006).  
 Perceived power over resources can also influence incentives to participate in and 
collaborate during collaborative decision-making processes (Imperial 2005). As the eminent 
political scientist Robert Dahl noted in 1957, power and its definition are context dependent 
and complicated. By asking participants to share resources for the collective good, the 
collaborative process effectively shifts resource control and power dynamics (e.g., losing or 
gaining resources, access to resources, etc.; Ostrom, 2011); therefore, power dynamics can 
influence both the starting conditions of a collaboration, interactions within the collaborative 
process, and collaborative outcomes. Despite the theoretical significance of social power 
within collaborative resource management, there is little to no empirical evidence about how 
this critical component influences perspective-taking during the collaborative process. There is 
currently no comprehensive framework on power in collaborative settings (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005) and minimal empirical data on how individuals and groups respond to 
asymmetric power dynamics within collaboration (Ostrom, 2011).  
 In this study we test existing models of collaborative decision-making for natural 
resource management by evaluating hypotheses about the relationship between perspective-
taking and collaborative outcomes and what happens to this relationship when participants start 
and end with asymmetrical levels of resource control (power). Our purpose is to develop a new 
framework for collaborative decision-making that includes both contextual and individual 
influences as starting conditions affecting the collaborative process (Figure 2). The framework 
assumes that institutional design (i.e., participatory inclusiveness, clear ground rules, process 
transparency and forum exclusiveness), facilitative leadership and additional starting 
conditions (i.e., incentives for and constraints on participation, and prehistory of cooperation or 
conflict) are also important predictors of collaborative outcomes, but in this analysis, we 
control these factors and focus instead on the relationships between power, perspective-taking 
and collaboration. We tested our hypotheses by measuring perspective-taking and collaborative 
behavior before and after participation in a computer simulated threshold public goods 
experiment. Each experiment included multiple rounds of a variation of a threshold public 
goods experiment where personal resources are risked for positive collective outcomes. 
Collective action problems, such as the joint management of natural resources, have 
traditionally been described as social dilemmas and have been modeled experimentally using 
prisoner’s dilemma games and public goods experiments (Ostrom, 2000).  
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Fig. 2. Integrated intellectual framework illustrating the relationship between key contextual 
and individual variables (empathy and power) and the collaborative process.  
The treatment version of this experiment was designed to arouse perspective-taking, therefore, 
we expect to see an increase in perspective-taking scores among the treatment groups. 
However, we also expect to see an interaction between power and perspective-taking. We 
propose that gaining resources will make players feel more powerful, which will result in 
lower posttest perspective-taking scores after the simulation.  
H1: Participants from groups that gain resources (start low | end high) will report lower posttest 
perspective-taking scores than groups that lost resources (start high | end low) or maintained the same 
resource level.  
Given the theoretical connection between perspective-taking and prosocial behavior, if shifting 
power dynamics result in lower posttest perspective-taking scores, they should also result in 
reduced collaborative behavior. We expect this relationship to be particularly important for 
groups that gained resources during the collaborative situation. There are conflicting examples 
of elevated social power levels encouraging increased cooperation (Galinsky et al., 2006) and 
interacting with social orientations that promote selfishness (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). 
There are few examples of research exploring the connection between power and collaborative 
behavior; however, in a recent example, researchers found that increasing player wealth within 
a rigged Monopoly game (i.e., twice the starting paper money, additional dice, and additional 
resources throughout the game, such as a higher bonus for passing go) led to displays of 
dominance and aggression among the powerful players (Piff, 2013). While we believe that 
gaining resources within a collaborative process will encourage egoistic behavior, we believe 
that losing resources will encourage participants to imagine what it feels like to walk in 
someone else’s shoes and result in increased perspective-taking and collaborative behavior. We 
therefore predicted that elevated power levels would reduce perspective-taking scores.  
H2: Groups that gain resources (start low | end high) will contribute less than groups that lost 
resources or maintained the same resource level.  
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3. METHOD 
3.1 Computer simulation 
In 2012, we developed a design artifact called Your Future Phoenix. This artifact was designed 
as a complement to the WaterSim model, developed by the National Science Foundation-
supported Decision Center for a Desert City (Gober, Wentz, Lant, Tschudi, & Kirkwood, 2011; 
Sampson, Escobar, Tschudi, Lant, & Gober, 2011). WaterSim is an interactive simulation 
model devised to help stakeholders deliberate on and explore the consequences of urban water 
planning decisions in central Arizona (Hu, Johnston, Hemphill, Krishnamurthy, & Vinze, 
2012). The artifact was developed to allow a) robust and reliable data capture, b) multiple 
simultaneous participation of hundreds of participants both individually and in teams, c) the 
flexibility to modularly modify scenarios with minimal overhead, and d) open resource sharing 
of theory, datasets and models. We chose a gamification approach to handle our complex real-
world scenarios and to improve the user experience and engagement (Detarding, Sicart, Nacke, 
O’Hara, & Dixon, 2011). The game modules were designed as independent and reconfigurable 
modules, allowing us to add and remove new scenarios or combinations of scenarios easily.2 In 
2013, we evaluated Your Future Phoenix, using pilot experiments to verify the accuracy of the 
database and logging service, data collection efficiency, and human-centered design 
requirements. Using field tests, we verified the accuracy of the player events as they are 
captured through the logging service and data persistence.  
3.2 Survey  
Before and after participating in the simulation, players were asked to complete a survey. The 
survey instrument, the Social Empathy Index (SEI), assesses levels of empathy influenced by 
cultural differences, social situations, and political and economic conditions (Gerdes, Segal, 
Jackson, & Mullins, 2011b; Lietz et al., 2011; Segal et al., 2012) and has been previously 
validated, tested and theoretically supported (Gerdes et al., 2011a; Segal, 2011; Segal, 2012; 
Segal et al., 2012). The SEI includes 22 items measuring interpersonal empathy, including five 
perspective-taking items and an additional seven items addressing two macro components of 
empathy, including macro self-other awareness/perspective-taking. To minimize social 
desirability effects, the instrument is titled “Human Relations Survey.” Responses range from 1 
(never) to 6 (always).  
3.3 Participants 
Undergraduate and graduate students from a public university in the Southwestern United 
States were recruited as participants for course credit (n=180). Participants were randomly 
assigned to groups (start high resource or start low resource) that were nested within classes 
and then the classes were randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions (Figure 4). The 
experiment was based on a between-participants design with four conditions: control 
conditions with either high resource groups (start high | end high) or low resource groups (start 
                                                
2  To develop the scenarios, we used Microsoft’s C# programming language and MVC framework, which 
allowed a simulation that provides real-life experiences to game participants. We used software libraries such 
as JQuery, HTML5, allowing for asynchronous users. 
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low | end low) that stay the same and treatment conditions with groups that lose resources (start 
high | end low) or gain resources (start low | end high). Groups were composed of 2-5 players.  
 
Fig. 3. Group Starting and Ending Resource Conditions in the 'Joint Reservoir Project' 
3.4 Design and treatment 
The focus of this natural resource management experiment was joint decisions about water use 
and management. The intervention began with information about water use in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area. Both treatment and control classes played the first round of the simulation in 
the same way. Groups that started with higher resources were told that they represented the city 
of Phoenix and had a total of 100 water units to allocate. Groups starting with lower resources 
were informed that they represented the city of Surprise and had a total of 70 water units to 
allocate (see Figure 3). In the first exercise, players were asked to allocate city resources (water 
units) across five water categories: residential, industrial, agricultural, urban development, and 
environmental. Players did this first as individuals and then as members of their assigned 
groups/cities (Phoenix or Surprise). Next, players were asked to donate city-owned water 
resources to support the development of a collaborative water project between the cities of 
Phoenix and Surprise (the ‘Joint Reservoir Project’). Participants were told that the water 
stored in the Joint Reservoir Project would be used to sustain residential and city services in 
drought years. A minimum joint contribution of 120 water units was required to establish the 
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reservoir (the threshold) that would benefit all the groups by increasing their overall water 
budgets in future years. Successful groups, those that reached the threshold, doubled the 
contributions available for future use. Groups that failed to reach the threshold lost their 
individual contributions. Groups were encouraged to discuss their decisions within their 
groups, but not with other groups. Pairs of Phoenix and Surprise teams were intentionally 
dispersed widely so that they could not interact during the deliberation. All groups submitted 
their contributions at the same time. The simulation disclosed the results only after all of the 
groups had submitted their decisions. After completing one round of the threshold public goods 
game, participants were asked to disclose whether their groups were successful or not. 
 Prior to round two, treatment classes were told that they would swap cities in the next 
round: representatives of Phoenix would move to Surprise and lose resource (water) units (start 
high | end low) and representatives of Surprise would move to Phoenix and gain water units 
(start low | end high). While water units changed, group composition, location in the room and 
membership did not. Control classes remained in the same low resource (start low | end low) 
and high resource (start high | end high) groups to play the second round (see Figure 3).  
  
Fig. 4. Diagram of Multilevel Model of Subjects Within Groups 
3.5 Group contribution (Group-level measure)  
Group contribution was measured as the total number of water units contributed in the 
threshold public goods game (the Joint Reservoir Project) (range 0-120) during the two rounds 
of play (time 1 and time 2). Because starting resource units (i.e., 70 or 100) varied between 
groups, we transformed all of the contribution amounts by dividing the responses by the total 
resource units available at the start of each round. The original dataset included a single 
contribution level for every player; since this value was the same across groups, we collapsed 
this item into a single group value.  
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3.6 Analysis 
Perspective-taking items (5 individual and 7 macro) were tested for reliability using 
Cronbach’s a and item analysis; a >.70 was considered acceptable (Nunnally, 1978; Vaske, 
2008).  
 We used SAS v9.4 to conduct two three-level models (model 1A and model 1B) to 
explore how group starting and ending resource levels influenced individual and macro 
perspective-taking. Individual and macro perspective-taking were the outcome variables for 
model 1A and model 1B, respectively. We also ran one two-level model (model 2) to explore 
how group starting and ending power levels influenced group contribution. Group contribution 
was the outcome variable in model 2. All of the models included time as a repeated measure. 
Across all of the models, group membership was the top-level experimental unit of the model 
(2 or 3; see Figure 4) and start resources and end resources were included as fixed factors at the 
group level. All models were estimated via the restricted maximum likelihood (RML) 
procedure. The criterion for statistical significance was p< 0.05.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four possible resource combinations: eleven 
start high | end high, start low | end low control groups (n=22) and eight start high | end low 
and start low | end high treatment groups (n=16). Participants were more likely to be female 
(54%) than male (46%) and the average age was 22. Most of the respondents described their 
race or ethnicity as Caucasian (54%) followed by Hispanic (15%), Asian (9%), and African 
American (4%) participants. Participants indicated 21 distinct academic majors, including 
public policy and administration (18%), criminology (10%), health and medicine (9%), 
business (8%) and communication (7%).  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables  
 
 Residual plots indicated there were no major concerns about normality. Both the 5-item 
individual perspective-taking scale (a = .715) and the 7-item macro perspective-taking scale 
 TIME Individual  
Perspective-taking 
Macro  
Perspective-taking 
Contribution 
  Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) 
Start High | End High 1 4.58 (0.102) 4.65 (0.112) 0.748 (0.063) 
Start High | End High 2 4.69 (0.106) 4.69 (0.109) 0.840 (0.063) 
Start Low | End Low 1 4.47 (0.116) 4.51 (0.121) 0.723 (0.073) 
Start Low | End Low 2 4.39 (0.116) 4.43 (0.123) 0.681 (0.073) 
Start High | End Low 1 4.36 (0.118) 4.39 (0.127) 0.602 (0.085) 
Start High | End Low 2 4.18 (0.120) 4.22 (0.129) 0.593 (0.085) 
Start Low | End High 1 4.49 (0.102) 4.52 (0.111) 0.764 (0.034) 
Start Low | End High 2 4.43 (0.103) 4.46 (0.111) 0.806 (0.034) 
Range  1-6 1-6 0-1 
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(a= .804) were reliable. Both perspective-taking scales were collapsed into a single item with a 
range of 1-6 (Table 1).  
Table 2. Two-Level Model Results Predicting Perspective-taking 
a SAS zero’s out the last category for each categorical variable. Thus, even though Start Resources has two levels, 
the second level is zero and the estimate in the table for b1 is for StartResources = 1. The same is true for 
EndResources and the interaction between StartRes*EndRes. 
b The test reported for the intercept differs from the tests for the other fixed effects in the model. 
4.2 Linear Mixed Models Results 
Mean scores for perspective-taking and contribution for all combinations of group start 
resource and end resource levels suggest that group responses varied between time 1 and time 
2 (Table 1). Hypothesis 1 proposed that shifting resource levels would reduce perspective-
taking; specifically, participants from groups that gained resources would report lower 
perspective-taking scores after the simulation compared to groups that lost resources or stayed 
the same. We tested this hypothesis by fitting two 3-level models with the same fixed effects 
 Model 1A 
Individual Perspective-taking 
Model 1B 
Macro Perspective-taking 
Fixed-Effect Parameter Estimate (SE)a Estimate (SE)a 
ß0 (Intercept) 4.427(0.10) 4.458(0.11) 
ß1 (Start Resources) -0.036(0.16) -0.032(0.17) 
ß2 (End Resources) -0.245(0.16) -0.238(0.17) 
ß3 (StartRes*EndRes) 0.551(0.22) 0.511(0.24) 
ß4 (Time) 0.066(0.11) 0.066(0.11) 
ß5 (StartRes*Time) 0.011(0.16) 0.021(0.16) 
ß6 (EndRes*Time) 0.108(0.17) 0.114(0.16) 
ß7 (StartRes*EndRes*Time) -0.302(0.24) -0.244(0.23) 
   
Covariance Parameter Estimate Estimate 
s2group -0.014 -0.037 
s2subject(group) 0.277 0.471 
s2e 0.253 0.232 
   
Model Information Criteria   
-2 REML log-likelihood 626.0 676.6 
AIC 642.0 682.6 
BIC 646.9 687.5 
   
Tests for Fixed Effects Type III F-Testsb Type III F-Testsb 
Intercept t= 42.77, df=61, p<.0001 t= 40.06, df=54, p<.0001 
Start Resources F = 3.28, df=1,30.5, p=0.079 F= 2.79, df=1,31, p=0.105 
End Resources F= 0.01, df=1,30.5, p=0.921 F= 0.02, df=1,31, p=0.899 
StartRes*EndRes F= 4.58, df=1,30.5, p=0.040 F= 3.52, df=1,31, p=0.070 
Time F= 0.74, df=1,147, p=0.392 F= 1.62, df=1,143, p=0.206 
StartRes*Time F= 1.40, df=1,147, p=0.238 F= 0.78, df=1,143, p=0.377 
EndRes*Time F= 0.13, df=1,147, p=0.721 F= 0.01, df=1,143, p=0.943 
StartRes*EndRes*Time F= 1.63, df=1,147, p=0.204 F= 1.15, df=1,143, p=0.286 
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(StartRes, End Res, and Time; Table 2). Our subjects were students and the dependent 
variables were individual perspective-taking scores (model 1A) and macro perspective-taking 
scores (model 1B). There was a significant effect of StartRes*EndRes on individual 
perspective-taking. There were no differences in perspective-taking at time 1. At time 2, the 
low resource control groups had higher scores on perspective-taking than the treatment groups 
that lost resources (see Table 1) Estimate(SE)=0.514(0.159); t(DF)=61.64(3,23), p=0.002. 
There were no significant fixed effects of starting resources, ending resources or time on macro 
perspective-taking.  
Table 3. Three-Level Model Results Predicting Contribution 
 Model 2 
Contribution 
Fixed-Effect Parameter Estimate (SE)a 
ß0 (Intercept) 0.806(0.03) 
ß1 (Start Resources) -0.124(0.08) 
ß2 (End Resources) -0.213(0.09) 
ß3 (StartRes*EndRes) 0.372(0.133) 
ß4 (Time) -0.041(0.02) 
ß5 (StartRes*Time) 0.083(0.091) 
ß6 (EndRes*Time) 0.051(0.110) 
ß7 (StartRes*EndRes*Time) -0.185(0.161) 
  
Covariance Parameter Estimate 
s2group 0.011 
s2e,11 0.033 
s2e,12 0.031 
s2e,21 0.047 
s2e,22 0.002 
  
Model Information Criteria  
-2 REML log-likelihood -35.8 
AIC -25.8 
BIC -17.6 
  
Tests for Fixed Effects Type III F-Testsb 
Intercept t = 23.38, df=9, p<.0001 
Start Resources F= 1.15, df=1,49.1 p=0.288 
End Resources F= 0.81, df=1,49.1 p=0.372 
StartRes*EndRes F= 6.97, df=1,49.1 p=0.011 
Time F= 0.26, d= 1,15, p=0.620 
StartRes*Time F= 0.01, d= 1,15, p=0.908 
EndRes*Time F= 0.27, d= 1,15, p=0.612 
StartRes*EndRes*Time F= 1.31, df= 1,49.1, p=0.270 
a SAS zero’s out the last category for each categorical variable. Thus, even though Start Resources has two levels, 
the second level is zero and the estimate in the table for b1 is for StartResources = 1. The same is true for 
EndResources and the interaction between StartRes*EndRes. 
b The test reported for the intercept differs from the tests for the other fixed effects in the model. 
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 Hypothesis 2 predicted that treatment group participants who gained resources would 
decrease their contribution from round 1 to round 2. We tested this effect by fitting a 2-level 
model with start resources and end resources as group-level covariates, time as a within-group 
factor and contribution as the dependent variable (Table 3). There was a significant effect of 
StartRes*EndRes on group contribution. There were no significant differences between the 
groups at time 1; however, at time 2, there were significant differences in contribution between 
the control groups and the treatment groups that lost resources. Low resource control groups 
contributed more at time 2 than the treatment groups that lost resources 
Estimate(SE)=0.247(0.106); t(DF)=2.34(21.91), p=.0290. The treatment groups that lost 
resources contributed less at time 2 than the high resource control groups Estimate(SE)=-
0.213(0.092); t(DF)=-2.32(13.68), p=.0364.  
 As expected, perspective-taking scores and collaborative behavior changed as a result 
of participation in the CM simulation. However, instead of an increase in posttest perspective-
taking scores in treatment groups that lost resources (start high | end low), these groups 
reported lower perspective-taking scores compared to control groups that maintained the same 
resource level. Additionally, treatment groups that lost resources (start high | end low) 
contributed less than groups that maintained the same resource level. Thus, these findings 
suggest that our CM simulation influenced perspective-taking and collaboration, but did not 
support the direction of our hypotheses. Instead of improving perspective-taking and 
collaboration, our simulation reduced these important variables. In the following section, we 
discuss some potential explanations for these results and implications for public engagement in 
collaborative natural resource management decisions.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Public engagement in natural resource management decisions will require the use of 
communication tools that build trust and shared understanding among diverse groups with 
disparate perspectives and different levels of resource control. This research explored whether 
a computer simulation could be used to influence perspective-taking and encourage 
collaborative action and how resource asymmetries during the collaborative process influence 
decision-making within the context of a resource-sharing dilemma.  
 Hypothesis 1 proposed that participants in groups that gained resources would report 
lower perspective-taking scores than groups that lost resources or maintained the same 
resource level during the computer simulation. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. 
Despite designing a computer simulation to promote perspective-taking, participants in the 
perspective-taking condition reported decreased perspective-taking scores over time. 
Differences in individual perspective-taking scores were observed between groups that lost 
resources and groups that maintained the same resource level.   
 The observed correlation between lower perspective-taking scores and reduced 
donations to the collaborative threshold public goods game provided support for the theoretical 
relationship between perspective-taking and collaborative behavior. However, the results did 
not support the direction of Hypothesis 2. Increased control over resources did not lead to more 
egoistic behavior; instead, loss of resources significantly decreased contributions at time 2.  
 In previous experiments involving simulated resource allocation negotiations, Epley et 
al. (2006) reported that perspective-taking within competitive interactions contributed to a 
focus on other players’ concerns and interests, which increased egoistic (selfish) behavior and 
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led to resource taking instead of sharing. Epley et al. (2006) also found that the impact of 
perspective-taking on behavior was moderated by the conditions of the interaction: cooperative 
conditions where participants had shared interests did not generate the same reactive egoistic 
behavior in response to a perspective-taking prompt. The simulation used for this research (the 
‘Joint Reserve Project’) was designed as a collaborative perspective-taking simulation. 
Participants who successfully collaborated in the threshold public goods game were rewarded 
with equal resources, regardless of what they initially contributed. Given the collaborative 
nature of our simulations, we were expecting the perspective-taking condition to prevent 
egoistic behavior. The observed egoistic behavior among groups that lost resources was 
unanticipated. In the following paragraphs, we explore alternative reasons why our data failed 
to support our hypotheses.  
 Communication is a key predictor of the success and efficiency of collaborative 
management and collective action (Ostrom, 2000) to conserve a common resource pool (e.g., 
Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Ostrom & Walker, 1991). 
Communication can promote norms that encourage cooperation and facilitate the development 
of group identity that can motivate prosocial action (Ostrom & Walker, 1991). It is possible 
that the climate of communication, defined as “an atmosphere within a team characterized by 
open, supportive communication, speaking up, and risk taking” (Gibson & Gibbs, 2006, p. 
456) shifted after treatment participants experienced the perspective-taking condition. The 
dynamic structural arrangements and shifting rules may have reduced trust and process 
predictability, which prevented risk taking activities (e.g., a larger contribution at time 2). 
Changes in the structure of the game and the rules (e.g., asking participants to swap roles) may 
have shifted the climate from a psychologically safe space where participants were willing to 
share opinions, respect other’s ideas and perspectives, and take calculated risks (Edmondson, 
1999) to a climate that created uncertainty, fear of failure, and heightened perceptions of risk, 
which reduced participant prosocial behavior in the second round. Uncertainty about whether 
potentially significant or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized can contribute to 
greater perceptions of risk and can make management goals and objectives more difficult to 
achieve (Johnston et al., 2011; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Since both treatment groups experienced 
a shift in the game and the rules but only the groups that lost resources (start high | end low) 
exhibited egoistic behavior, this alternative explanation seems unlikely.  
 Ostrom (2000) described a number of factors that influence contributions to a public 
good that might have affected our experimental results, including the framing of the situation 
and communication between participants. Framing within public good experiments influences 
participant behavior (see Andreoni, 1995; Elliot, Hayward, & Canon, 1998; Cookson, 2000; 
Park, 2000; Pruitt 1967, 1970; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). Frames that emphasize 
teamwork can increase cooperation (Sonnemans, Schram, & Offerman, 1998). Positive 
framing, emphasizing that a contribution will have a public good, and a positive benefit for 
other participants, has been found to generate more prosocial behavior than framing a 
contribution as a prevention of a public bad, which will make the other subjects worse off 
(Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). 
Subjects consistently contribute more under positive framing conditions than negative ones. 
However, additional research has suggested this gap occurs only within a repetitive game 
(Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). Other researchers have suggested that it is not necessarily 
the perception of public good that induces greater collaboration but perceptions of other 
players’ contributions that drive this response (Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). Beliefs about 
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other players’ potential contributions can generate normative concerns about fairness and 
reciprocity that encourage an individual to contribute or defect (Dawes et al., 1977; Rege & 
Telle, 2004). “If the framing of the public good game makes a person more optimistic about 
other people’s adherence to a norm for cooperation, then his dominant strategy may no longer 
be to defect” (Rege & Telle, 2004, p.1631). It is possible that shifting roles shifted treatment 
group player perceptions from collaborative to competitive. Although in this case, we would 
have expected to see egoistic behavior in both the lose resource and gain resource treatment 
groups.  
 The small number of groups used in this research may have, in some cases, reduced our 
ability to see a significant effect. Nonetheless, the results indicated an important predictive 
relationship between perspective-taking and collaborative behavior that has been observed in 
other studies and contexts. Also, this study explored these relationships with undergraduate and 
graduate students who may differ from the general public in ways that limit the generalizability 
of this research. Future research should explore these relationships with representative samples 
of the public or natural resource interest groups. These observations were made after only one 
treatment or swap resources round. Future research should also explore whether the observed 
relationships are seen in a repetitive game with multiple rounds.  
5.1 Implications for Theory and Practice  
Disparities in control over resources and decision-making influence are ubiquitous in real-
world governance challenges. The common theoretical assumption is that collaborative natural 
resource processes can overcome these inequalities in power by generating perspective-taking, 
which promotes shared understanding and leads to prosocial behaviors (i.e., collaborative 
outcomes). Existing interventions that try to generate perspective-taking, focus primarily on 
the affective (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) and psychological aspect of perspective-taking (Gerdes, Segal & 
Lietz, 2010). In this research, we were interested in perspective-taking that encourages the 
behavioral adoption of empathic action (Segal, 2011). Our results suggest that this type of 
perspective-taking may be difficult to generate reliably and sustainably. Future steps should 
include the development and testing of additional approaches to arouse perspective-taking and 
collaborative behavior.  
 Previous research has suggested that perspective-taking can, in some cases, lead to 
egoistic behavior, as it did in this study. Our results add to the growing body of evidence that 
identify perspective-taking as a significant and important precursor of prosocial behavior. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that both the arousal and attenuation of perspective-taking can 
generate egoistic behavior.  
 Finally, our results have important implications for collaborative processes, which ask 
participants to share resources, decision-making authority, or power for the collective good. 
Current models of collaborative resource management that ignore the role of power within the 
collaborative process may be missing key information about the effect of starting resource 
control and shifting resource control on the relationship between perspective-taking and 
prosocial behavior. If powerful participants react to the loss of resources, control, or power by 
turning away from others, becoming less empathic, and more selfish, it suggests that power is 
not only a starting condition required for collaboration but also an important factor 
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contributing to whether collaborative processes result in shared understanding or collaborative 
failure.  
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